

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-06

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2058

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY TUNIS

USMISSION BERLIN

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USINT ALGIERS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 06703

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, GW, EG, AG, XF, XT

SUBJECT: BRANDT'S TRIP TO ALGIERS AND CAIRO

REF: (A) ALGIERS 828; (B) CAIRO 2560

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SUMMARY: STATE SECRETARY FRANK, WHO ACCOMPANIED THE

CHANCELLOR ON HIS JUST ENDED MID-EASTERN TRIP, BRIEFED THE AMBASSADOR ON APRIL 25 ON THE RESULTS OF THE TRIP AND ON THE MAIN IMPRESSIONS THE GERMANS BROUGHT HOME WITH THEM. GERMANS WERE EVIDENTLY WELL PLEASED WITH THEIR RECEPTION IN BOTH CAPITALS AND, DESPITE GREAT DIFFERENCES IN ATMOSPHERE AND EMPHASIS BETWEEN THE TWO, WERE IMPRESSED BY STATESMANLIKE APPROACH OF BOTH BOUMEDIENE AND SADAT. GERMANS GAINED IMPRESSION THAT ARABS DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS AND PARTICULARLY SINCE THE YOM KIPPUR WAR HAD COME TO REALIZE THAT ARAB COUNTRIES HAD BROAD OVERRIDING INTERESTS WHICH WOULD BE SERIOUSLY ENDANGERED IF THEY CONTINUED TO PUT THE CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL IN THE FOREFRONT OF EVERY DISCUSSION. IN EGYPT, GERMANS WERE ABOVE ALL IMPRESSED BY SADAT'S DETERMINATION TO MAKE PEACE AND BY HIS ABSOLUTE CONFIDENCE IN SECRETARY KISSINGER'S EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AT THE SAME TIME, FRANK EXPRESSED SOME BEWILDERMENT OVER EXTENT OF EGYPTIAN HOSTILITY TOWARDS THE USSR. END SUMMARY.

1. FRANK OPENED BY SAYING THAT THE GERMANS REGARDED BRANDT'S VISIT TO ALGERIA AND EGYPT, ALONG WITH HIS JUNE 1973 TRIP TO ISRAEL, AS A MANIFESTATION OF THE FRG'S POLICY OF EVEN-HANDEDNESS AND NEUTRALITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IF BRANDT HAD NOT SUCCEEDED LAST YEAR IN PERSUADING THE ISRAELI OF HIS EARNESTNESS IN PURSUING THIS POLICY, THE PRESENT VISITS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE SUCCESS THEY TURNED OUT TO BE. THE GERMANS, FRANK MADE CLEAR, REGARDED THE BRANDT VISIT AS COMPLEMENTING AND SUPPORTING U.S. EFFORTS FOR A PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. ALGERIA. BOUMEDIENE WAS AT THE CENTER OF ALL CONVERSATIONS THE GERMANS HAD IN ALGIERS. THERE WERE NO PARALLEL TALKS. THE GERMANS WERE IMPRESSED BY BOUMEDIENE'S SOMEWHAT INTROSPECTIVE EARNESTNESS AND BY HIS GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE. THEY HAD FEARED BEING SUBJECTED TO A SERIES OF CATEGORICAL STATEMENTS ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT IN THE EVENT LITTLE WAS SAID ABOUT THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AS SUCH.

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3. BOUMEDIENE PUT THE GREATEST EMPHASIS ON HIS VIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEVELOPING WORLD AND THE WORLD OF DEVELOPED INDUSTRIAL STATES, MAKING A DISTINCTION, WITH REGARD TO THE FORMER, BETWEEN THOSE THAT POSSESSED VALUABLE RAW MATERIALS AND THOSE WHICH DID NOT. THIS WAS A RELATIONSHIP THAT NOW HAD TO BE WORKED OUT ON A NEW AND GLOBAL BASIS WHICH IN SOME WAY WOULD ESTABLISH A NEW VALUE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RAW MATERIALS AND

THE INDUSTRIES THAT CONSUMED THEM. BOUMEDIENE HAD NO CLEAR NOTION OF HOW THIS COULD BE DONE, BUT IT WAS EVIDENT THAT EXISTING MECHANISMS, IN WHICH THE PRINCIPLE OF THE GREATEST PROFIT WAS ALWAYS DECISIVE IN THE END, WERE NO LONGER ADEQUATE.

4. BRANDT COMMENTED TO BOUMEDIENE THAT, IN VIEW OF THE LATTER'S BROAD VIEW OF THIS PROBLEM, HE FOUND IT SOMEWHAT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND BOUMEDIENE'S VOCIFEROUS OPPOSITION TO THE WASHINGTON ENERGY CONFERENCE. BOUMEDIENE'S REPLY WAS INTERESTING BECAUSE HE QUALIFIED HIS OPPOSITION TO THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE BY SAYING IT STEMMED FROM THE PREPARATORY PERIOD, WHEN IT WAS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE WASHINGTON CONFEREES WERE AIMING AT CONFRONTATION WITH THE OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES OR

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WHETHER THEY WERE PREPARED TO TAKE A BROADER AND MORE COOPERATIVE APPROACH. HE IMPLIED, FRANK SAID, THAT HE HAD NOW COME TO THE LATTER CONCLUSION AND THAT HIS OPPOSITION TO THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE HAD ACCORDINGLY GREATLY DIMINISHED.

5. IT APPEARED TO THE GERMANS THAT BOUMEDIENE SHOWED
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EQUAL COOLNESS TOWARD THE U.S. AND THE USSR. HE THOUGHT THE SUPERPOWERS BOTH REGARDED THE MIDDLE EAST AS ONE MORE TERRAIN ON WHICH TO CARRY OUT THEIR STRUGGLE FOR INFLUENCE IN THE WORLD. ACCORDINGLY, BOUMEDIENE FAVORED A VERY CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND THE EC AND EXPRESSED STRONG INTEREST IN EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN-ARAB DIALOGUE, WHICH HE SAW AS A CHANCE TO SET UP A NEW MODEL FOR THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GROUPS OF DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED STATES. FRANK SAID THAT BRANDT, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THE EUROPEAN INTEREST IN CARRYING OUT THIS DIALOGUE, HAD TAKEN CARE TO POINT OUT TO BOUMEDIENE THAT THE FRG WAS IN A FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT SITUATION AS REGARDED ITS SECURITY. IT COULD NOT TAKE A POSITION OF NEUTRALITY BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS. NATO CONTINUED TO BE ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO THE FRG'S SECURITY.

6. FRANK COMMENTED WITH SOME INTEREST ON CHANGES IN BOUMEDIENE'S DRESS AND DEMEANOR DURING RECENT YEARS. WHEREAS HE HAD FORMERLY DRESSED IN SOBER AND UNDISTINGUISHED MILITARY FASHION, EVEN FOR FUNCTIONS OF STATE, HE WAS NOW WEARING WELL-TAILORED SUITS AND BRIGHT FASHIONABLE NECKTIES. MOREOVER HE HAD EVEN TAKEN HIS WIFE TO THE STATE DINNER GIVEN FOR BRANDT.

7. EGYPT. THE ATMOSPHERE IN CAIRO, FRANK SAID, WAS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT, REFLECTING THE LEADERSHIP HABITS OF A WELL-ESTABLISHED BOURGEOISIE (AS OPPOSED TO THE DYNAMIC AND YOUTHFUL CHARACTER OF THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN ALGERIA). STRONGEST IMPRESSION THE GERMANS RECEIVED WAS THAT IT WAS ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN THAT SADAT WANTED

PEACE AND THAT HE HAD UNLIMITED CONFIDENCE IN SECRETARY KISSINGER'S EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD - SO MUCH SO THAT HE HAD INDISSOLUBLY TIED HIS OWN DESTINY TO THE SUCCESS OF THE SECRETARY'S MISSION. SADAT APPEARED CONVINCED THAT THERE WOULD BE A SUCCESSFUL DISENGAGEMENT BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL, ALTHOUGH HE REALIZED HOW DIFFICULT THIS WAS FOR ASSAD. (ON THE OTHER HAND, EGYPTIANS WERE STRONGLY NEGATIVE IN THEIR JUDGMENTS ON IRAQ.) SADAT REPLIED TO WHAT FRANK DESCRIBED AS A RATHER INDISCREET QUESTION FROM A GERMAN JOURNALIST ON THE PROSPECT FOR FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL BY SAYING THAT SUCH RELATIONS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE IN THE NEXT GENERATION. AT THE SAME TIME, HE SPOKE IN CONCILIATORY TONES AND MADE CLEAR THAT THIS EVENTUAL POSSIBILITY WAS WHAT HIS POLICY WAS INTENDED TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR.

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8. FRANK SAID THE GERMANS FOUND IT HARD TO UNDERSTAND (AT LEAST FROM A TACTICAL STANDPOINT) THE VEHEMENCE OF SADAT'S HOSTILITY TOWARDS THE SOVIETS. FRANK RECALLED EARLIER US-FRG CONVERSATIONS (E.G., WITH THEN ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO LAST FALL) IN WHICH THE QUESTION OF JOINT U.S. AND SOVIET AUSPICES FOR A MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. THE QUESTION SADAT'S BEHAVIOR NOW RAISED WAS WHETHER A DIRECTLY INVOLVED COUNTRY SUCH TO THESE "AUSPICES", PARTICULARLY AT A TIME WHEN THE DIFFICULTIES IN ACHIEVING DISENGAGEMENT BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL STILL APPEARED SO GREAT. FRANK REFLECTED THAT SADAT MIGHT BE COUNTING ON U.S. RESPECT AND ADMIRATION FOR HIS POLICY TO COMPENSATE FOR HIS LOSS IN CONTACT WITH MOSCOW. FRANK MADE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE GERMANS HAD THEIR DOUBTS ABOUT THE WISDOM OF THIS APPROACH.

9. WITH REGARD TO ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, FRANK SAID THAT THE GERMANS HAD NOT GONE TO CAIRO PREPARED TO DISCUSS FIGURES. THEY NEEDED FIRST TO ESTABLISH A FIRM POLITICAL FOUNDATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND TO DETERMINE BOTH WHAT EGYPT'S REASONABLE REQUIREMENTS WERE AND WHAT WAS THE FRG'S CAPACITY TO ASSIST. IT WAS FOR THESE PURPOSES THAT THE "GERMAN-EGYPTIAN COMMISSION FOR DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION" HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. THE GERMANS FEEL THAT SADAT WAS SATISFIED WITH THIS PROCEDURE ALTHOUGH THEY RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WAS A TENDENCY ON THE PART OF THE EGYPTIANS, JUST AS ELSEWHERE (E.G., IN THE USSR), TO REGARD THE FRG AS A KIND OF INEXHAUSTIBLE CORNUCOPIA. IN

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ANY EVENT, THE GERMANS DID NOT REGARD THE JOINT COMMIS-
SION, WHICH WOULD MEET THREE TIMES A YEAR, AS A DEBATING
SOCIETY BUT RATHER AS AN AGENCY FOR COORDINATION AND
DECISION. IN ORDER TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE NEED FOR
MAINTAINING MOMENTUM IN THE DEVELOPING FRG RELATIONSHIP
WITH EGYPT, IT WOULD MEET FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MAY (IN
BONN) AND FRANK IMPLIED THAT INITIAL CONCRETE DECISIONS

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ON COOPERATIVE PROJECTS WOULD BE MADE AT THAT TIME. (AN ECONOMICS MINISTRY SOURCE, IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION, HAS TOLD EMBOFF THAT THE IDEA OF A JOINT COMMISSION HAD NOT BEEN STAFFED OUT BEFORE BRANDT'S DEPARTURE BUT HAD BEEN COOKED UP BY BRANDT, BAHR, AND FRANK ON THE SPOT IN CAIRO IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO MAKE SOME POSITIVE GESTURE DURING THE VISIT. SAME SOURCE OBSERVED THAT BRANDT DISLIKES DEALING WITH AID ISSUES AT HIGH LEVELS AND PREFERS TO STEER THEM TO THE TECHNICAL LEVEL). FRANK NOTED THAT CURRENT EGYPTIAN INDEBTEDNESS TO THE FRG IS ON THE ORDER OF DM 800 MILLION AND THAT ONE COULD EXPECT IT TO CLIMB OVER THE DM ONE BILLION MARK BEFORE LONG.

10. COMMENTING ON THE GERMAN DELEGATION'S DINNER MEETING WITH ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL RIAD, FRANK SAID IT HAD BEEN EVIDENT THERE THAT THE ARABS WERE BEGINNING TO THINK MORE SERIOUSLY THAN EVER BEFORE ABOUT THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE ENERGY PROBLEM. ACCORDING TO THEIR CALCULATIONS, RIAD SAID, THE INCOME FROM OIL OF ARAB OIL PRODUCERS IN 1980 WOULD BE AROUND 120 BILLION DOLLARS AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES, EVEN ON AN OPTIMISTIC ASSUMPTION, WOULD ONLY BE ABLE REASONABLY TO INVEST ABOUT ONE-FIFTH OF THAT SUM. FRANK EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THIS KIND OF CALCULATION REPRESENTED A CONSIDERABLE ADVANCE IN ARAB THINKING.

11. WITH REGARD TO VISITS TO SUEZ AND THE EASTERN BANK OF THE CANAL, FRANK SAID NOTHING TO INDICATE THAT GERMANS FELT THESE HAD BEEN FORCED ON THEM AGAINST THEIR WILL (CF. PARA 8 OF REFTEL B). HOWEVER, HE DID SEEM A BIT DEFENSIVE IN HIS COMMENTS ON THE EAST BANK, NOTING THAT THIS WAS AFTER ALL LIBERATED RATHER THAN CONQUERED TERRITORY AND THAT THE ISRAELI COULD HARDLY TAKE OFFENSE AT THE VISIT TO IT. THERE WAS IMPLIED A CERTAIN FEAR THAT THEY MIGHT INDEED PROTEST.

12. FRANK NOTED REPORTS OF SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S STATEMENT ON POSSIBLE WEAPONS DELIVERIES TO EGYPT (WHICH HE SAID HAD BEEN HEAVILY REPORTED IN THE CAIRO NEWS-PAPERS); HE STRESSED THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ANY SUPPORT OF THIS KIND FROM THE FRG, WHICH INTENDED, PARTICULARLY

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VIS-A-VIS THE MIDDLE EAST, TO FOLLOW RIGOROUSLY ITS POLICY OF NOT SHIPPING WEAPONS TO AREAS OF TENSION.

13. IN CONCLUSION, FRANK REITERATED THE VIEW, WHICH HE HAD EXPRESSED SEVERAL TIMES IN THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION, THAT THE BRANDT VISIT SUPPORTED SADAT'S PEACE POLICY AND THE EFFORTS OF SECRETARY KISSINGER TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE CITED WITH EVIDENT APPROVAL A STATEMENT THAT BOUTEFlickA HAD MADE TO HIM TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE HAD NEVER BEEN A MORE FAVORABLE MOMENT THAN THE PRESENT FOR A SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE BORDERS OF 1967.
HILLENBRAND

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